Here is the abstract of the paper:
Friday, 16 November 2012
Metaphysics of Messianic Time - University of Iceland 28th November
Here is the abstract of the paper:
Wednesday, 5 September 2012
Nuclear Futurism Available Now
Although the offical publication date is not until the 28th of
September, Nuclear Futurism from Zero Books is already in stock and
available.I recommend that you buy it from your local independent bookshop, but in the unlikely event it is
In the UK:
http://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Futurism-Work-Remainderless-Destruction/dp/1780994338/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1346860389&sr=8-1&keywords=nuclear+futurism
In Australia/rest of the world:
Friday, 31 August 2012
News and a link
http://zero-books.net/blogs/zero/the-open-space-of-the-future-liam-sprod/
Monday, 14 May 2012
Against All Ends: Hauntology, aesthetics, ontology
"Although it is already old, considering hauntology as either genre, aesthetic or zeitgeist is problematic; and is so for precisely all of the reasons that it claims to be each of these things. As nostalgia for lost futures or mourning for utopia, it falls into for the exact problems of utopianism that lead to its initial loss. It is also these problems that hauntology was developed to overcome, so its reduction precisely to them is somewhat ironic, if not cause for yet another mourning. Thus through exploring the way in which hauntology has been co-opted by the over-theoretisation of music, and indeed art more generally, in such a way that repeats these problems, I will also show the way for a return to hauntology as a solution to these problems and the affirmation of a more radical thinking for the future."
Read the whole thing here:
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/against-all-ends-hauntology-aesthetics-ontology/
I find the uptake of hauntology as a genre or aesthetic a bit strange as it negates much of the strength of Derrida's original formulation. But this is not the only time that art theory borrows something from philosophy and discards the foundational part of its thinking, or the wider consequences of a metaphysical framework. But this is a line of thought that is in progress, hauntology is one one manifestation...
Thursday, 10 May 2012
The Ends of Europe: Hegelstrasse - Einbahnstrasse
A new
tourist I mistakenly do that which will hide all history from me: a walking
tour. The guide tells us how he worked
in Berlin for the British Secret Service, helping refugees from the East settle
in the West. Capitalism saw no borders
within Germany, it had already broken down the Chinese Wall, it knew that this
one too would fall. My guide tells us
that he had named his daughter Maureen, after ‘mauer,’ German for wall. The word inscribed at intervals on the double
line of cobbles that traces the path of the Wall. Later I follow this line, East on my left,
West to the right.
But I
want more than that life, I am searching for the beyond glimpsed backwards
through those chinks in the Wall on television all those years ago. Something else, something to believe in. In Berlin I visit Hegel’s grave, just to make
sure he is dead. The great thinker of
historicity, of the end of history. In
Jena I look up at the window out of which he watched Napoleon ride past in 1806:
“Today I saw the spirit of the world,” he wrote to a friend. What do I see gazing back up at that window
looking and longing to be touched by history?
A tram rumbles past, there is a market in the square, I catch the train
back to Weimar and my hostel. His grave
was small, there were bullet makes on the mausoleums in the cemetery, another
war for another freedom.
The
streets in Mostar are also full of bullet holes. “This was the front line,” I am told, the war
raged along this street, now all the houses are left in ruin, the monuments and
public squares have not been rebuilt. Is
this because people want to remember, or want to forget? When the war broke out the Bosnians and
Croats joined forces to drive out the Serbs, that done they then turned on each
other, bisecting the town. The bridge here once connected the world in a way
that Napoleon never did, destroyed in the war but rebuilt, now the tourists
come here in the summer to dive off: fifteen metres to the water below, they
get a certificate afterwards.Monday, 26 March 2012
The Challenge of Facticity and the Gaps of the Absolute: Speculative Realism 10 and conclusion
Part One: Slippages in the Universal
Part Two: Trauma and Transcendence
Part Three: The Sublime as Exogenic Trauma
Part Four: The Moral Law as Endogenic Trauma
Part Five: Reading Kant Backwards
Part Seven: Traces of Spectres
Part Eight: The Structure of the Trace-Écart as a New Form of Sensibility
Part Nine: The Spaces of the Absolute: Catren and écart
10. The Challenge of Facticity and the Gaps of the Absolute.
As has been shown the freedom of autonomy is a vital element of not only Kant’s moral philosophy but it also reinscribes itself back into his metaphysics and addresses the Humean problems of induction and causation. As a result it is also possible to approach the problems of freedom from the perspective of causation, which is exactly what Žižek does when he writes: “Freedom is not simply the opposite of deterministic causal necessity: as Kant knew. It means a specific mode of causality; the agent’s self-determination.”[1] The reading developed above through the place of autonomy in Kant’s moral philosophy goes even further and suggests that the very possibility of an understanding of causation (in whatever form) is made possible by the fundamental self-causation of autonomy. The question must then arise as to how self-causation and material causation relate? Žižek answers this with what he calls a second-order reflexive causality, whereby:
I am determined by causes (be it direct brute natural causes or motivations), and the space of freedom is not a magic gap in this first level causal chain but my ability to retroactively choose/determine which causes will determine me.[2]
This is very similar to the backwards reading of Kant developed above, which suggests that it is the autonomy of the subject to be causally self determined that the concept of causality can by extension also be applied to the world. Here the so-called ‘levels’ of causality are reversed, but perhaps the idea of freedom as a gap (écart) remains important to the relationships between subjectivity, objectivity, autonomy, causality and, as will become apparent, contingency in play here.
Brassier explicitly sets out this set of relations when he summarises Žižek’s position as: “the subject achieves its autonomy by retroactively positing/reintegrating its own contingent material determinants: freedom is the subjective necessity of objective contingency.”[3] This characterisation allows Brassier to criticise what he perceives as Žižek’s doctrine of the necessity of contingency. Where it is freedom that allows the subject to determine its own necessity within the contingent universe. The criticism that Brassier puts forward against Žižek extends from Meillassoux’s absolutisation of contingency, which then cuts across both so-called levels of causality. Just as this radical contingency destroys materialist determinism, it also attacks the idealist conception of subjective freedom as a sort of second order causality. As contingency reduces every choice to a state of equal arbitrariness the distinction between a forced and unforced, or free and un-free, decision disintegrates. As Brassier puts it:
Thus it becomes impossible to distinguish between objective compulsion and subjective reflexion, phenomenal heternomy and noumenal autonomy. The principle of factuality collapses the distinction between first and second order levels of determination, thereby undermining any attempt to distinguish between objective heteronomy and subjective autonomy.[4]
While this line of critique is effective against the sort of autonomy attributed to Žižek, i.e., as a second order self-reflexive causality, the reading of autonomy as an eruption of the absolute through the abyss at the base of Kant’s metaphysics does not rely upon this hierarchical set of ‘causalities’ and thus is not prey to this line of critique. Through the importance of this fundament insight into the heart of the Kantian abyss it is possible to retrieve autonomy from the threat of Meillassoux’s factuality and also to establish the metaphysical nature of the trace-écart structure.
Within Kant’s moral philosophy autonomy was postulated not as a second order freedom required for the possibility of morality in the face of a deterministic universe, but rather a necessary element of the moral law as a law of absolute necessity. However, in some sense the nature of this absolute necessity remains up for grabs. As the analysis of Kant’s moral philosophy showed it was autonomy that made possible necessity and the related idea of causality, freedom is fundamental to rationality and the synthetic a priori. Freedom does not appear in contrast to a causally determined world, but rather the world of causation is determined by freedom. In the language of Meillassoux or Brassier, the necessity of causality is contingent to the potentialities of autonomy.
In this analysis of Kant, freedom was characterised as an eruption of the absolute into the world that made reason and the synthetic a priori possible. This was due to the fact that freedom as autonomy reflected the absolute necessity of the moral law, but as was said above this absolute necessity remains open. Instead of thinking of it as that which is absolutely necessary, it is perhaps more useful to think of it as a form of necessity conditioned by the disruptive force of the absolute. It is here that the trace-écart structure becomes both useful and possible. The spacing of écart as a gap in the absolute or the yawning of the abyss of the absolute has been suggested through the readings of both Catren and Negarestani. However, in this Kantian reading it takes on a much more metaphysical aspect and connects back to the forms of space and time. The eruption of the absolute through autonomy opens up the space of the écart where necessity and causality become possible through the operation of the synthetic a priori. However, in making this gap apparent and in closing it off by the erecting of the systems of either causality or subjectivity over the top of this abyss it is also negated through a limitation. The difference between the abyssiality of the écart and the necessity of causality that it makes possible establishes the movement of the trace, which is itself part of the construction of causality in its explicitly temporal nature. Here is the primary form of the trace-écart structure as the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time.
The dual becoming of this structure mirrors the more explicitly Hegelian answer that Žižek gives to Brassier’s criticisms. By flipping the charge against him – that of the necessity of contingency – and focusing on the contingency of necessity Žižek can draw out the nature of contradiction in its particularly Hegelian form, which he defines as “not a direct motionless ‘coincidence of the opposites’ (A is non-A): it is identity itself, its assertion, which ‘destabilizes’ a thing, introducing the crack of an impossibility into its texture.”[5] The most fundamental contradiction is between Being and Nothing, and the outcome of the destabilization of this contradiction is the thoroughly contingent movement of Becoming Something(s).[6] Becoming as a sort of spacing is already here in the form of the ‘crack of impossibility’ through which the absolute begins to peek amidst the facticity of the chaos of the Something(s). It is this connection between facticity and the absolute that was the basis for Brassier’s criticism of Žižek, and thus it is worth examining this connection in more detail especially as it relates to the expanded structure of trace-écart.
Facticity is central to Meillassoux’s speculative project and his critique of corellationism, which resists the limitations of transcendental philosophy. He summarises the fundamental relationship in question as:
Facticity will be revealed to be a knowledge of the absolute because we are going to put back into the thing itself what we mistakenly mistook to be an incapacity in our thought. In other words, instead of construing the absence of reason inherent in everything as a limit that thought encounters in its search for the ultimate reason, we must understand that this absence of reason is, and can only be the ultimate property of the entity.[7]
It is through facticity that Meillassoux aims to retrieve the absolute from behind the impenetrable barrier of corellationism and reintegrate the thing itself with speculative philosophy. Reason is no longer the limit upon knowledge that restricts access to the thing itself, but is rather the very action of the absolute within the thing itself. The levelling force of facticity reduces the possibility or even the need for the second level causality that Žižek puts forward. However, this does not apply to the reading of Kant that postulates autonomy as the disruptive spacing of the absolute; indeed there are even similarities between these two positions. The absence of reason that Meillassoux invokes is very similar to the écart opened by the eruption of the absolute. This similarity is made obvious when Žižek compares the sort of access to the absolute suggested by Meillassoux to Brecht’s idea that:
the background of the stage should ideally be empty, white, signalling that, behind what we see and experience, there is no secret Origin or Ground. This in no way implies that reality is transparent to us, that we ‘know all’; of course there are infinite blanks, but the point is that these blanks are just that, blanks, things we simply do not know, not a substantial ‘deeper’ reality.[8]
The structure of trace-écart presents a slightly different reading of these blanks, whereby rather than being ‘just blanks’ they are active in their very blankness within the presence of the stage. They are abyssal in their infinite absence and yet at the same time are a constitutive element of the stage itself, opening up the space within which the action of the play is traced. This structure of the abyssal articulation of the trace-écart thus provides a way in which to engage with the absolute as a constitutive contingency of reality. As Žižek suggests:
If we can think our knowledge of reality (i.e., the way reality appears to us) as radically failed, as radically different from the Absolute, then this gap (between for-us and in-itself) must be part of the Absolute itself, so that the very feature that seemed forever to keep us away from the Absolute is the only feature which directly unites us with the Absolute.[9]
Again, as with Brecht’s blanks, the fully fundamental and absolute nature of this gap is not fully articulated, or rather and more crucially, is blocked off by the insistence upon the ‘we’ already (dis)connected from the absolute. Here Žižek repeats the same mistake as Kant and tends towards philosophical anthropology, this time hidden behind the figure of the subject.
The turn towards the subject pre-empts Žižek’s critique of speculative realism in general, that it still needs to articulate “a theory of the subject which is neither that of transcendental subjectivity nor that of reducing the subject to a part of objective reality.”[10] This evocation of the questions of the subject is the closest Žižek comes to refuting Brassier’s criticisms. He is much more interested in highlighting the similarities between Hegel and Meillassoux; and as such it seems almost incidental that in doing so he opens up this gap of the absolute within which freedom appears, only to revert to framing this question in terms of the subject: “For Hegel, true freedom has nothing to do with capricious choice; it means the priority of self-relating to relating-to-other”[11] The questions raised by Brassier of the distinction between autonomy and hetronomy and the place and possibility of causality as subsumed by the question of the relationality of the subject. However, in repeating the Kantian mistake of shying away from the abyss, Žižek has gone some way in opening the structure of the trace-écart and the possibility of an alternative reading of Kant, which bypasses the philosophical anthropology of the first critique and chases the transcendental imagination, unity of apperception and the possibility of the absolute through the autonomy and the sublime of the latter two critiques.
Conclusion
The common theme running through speculative realism is the aim to escape from the anthropocentrism of the correlationism stemming from the Kantian Copernican revolution. This takes many different forms: the open universe of Negarestani, the internal problems of apperception identified by Brassier, or the arche-fossil of Meillassoux. However, each of these critiques essentially is only attempting to repeat the Kantian project of setting out a guarantee of universal or absolute knowledge. To this end rather than using speculative realism to dismiss the achievements of Kant, it is possible to utilise the problems raised by these critiques to prompt an alternative reading of Kant, which emphasises the importance of the second and third critiques for the project of the first. This backwards reading also attempts to solve the issues which Kant himself identified and attempted to resolve in his rewriting of the first critique. Here, instead of relying upon the unity of apperception to underpin the possibility of the synthetic a priori this role is provided by the eruption of the absolute through the autonomy of the moral law and the sublime, or in Kant’s phrase, the wonder of the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Reformulating the Kantian project in this way reconnects the absolute to the world instead of confining it to a limited and limiting role as the barrier of the forms of perception and understanding. Consequently, it is also necessary to reformulate the forms of space and time to incorporate this power and abyssality of the absolute. To this end the Derridian structure of the trace-écart replaced the Kantian forms of time and space. While the importance of the trace has long been recognised, emphasising the importance of écart reveals the properly metaphysical element of this structure, as well as how the spacing of the gap plays an important role within speculative metaphysics as the space of the absolute.
[1] S. Žižek, The Parallax View. p. 203. Quoted in R. Brassier, Nihil Unbound. p. 247 n15.
[2] S. Žižek, The Parallax View. p. 203. Quoted in R. Brassier, Nihil Unbound. p. 247 n15.
[3] R. Brassier, Nihil Unbound. p. 247 n15.
[4] R. Brassier, Nihil Unbound. p. 247 n15.
[5] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview,’ in L. Bryant et al, The Speculative Turn. p. 411.
[6] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview.’ p. 411.
[7] Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude. p. 53.
[8] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview.’ p. 412.
[9] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview.’ p. 413.
[10] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview.’ p. 415.
[11] S. Žižek & B. Woodard, ‘Interview.’ p. 415.
Wednesday, 21 March 2012
The Space of the Absolute: Speculative Realism 9
Part One: Slippages in the Universal
Part Two: Trauma and Transcendence
Part Three: The Sublime as Exogenic Trauma
Part Four: The Moral Law as Endogenic Trauma
Part Five: Reading Kant Backwards
Part Seven: Traces of Spectres
Part Eight: The Structure of the Trace-Écart as a New Form of Sensibility
9. The Spaces of the Absolute: Catren and écart.
The connection between speculative realism and the image of the gap as écart and the connection to the absolute resonates particularly strongly when considering the often-manifested image of the open. A perfect example can be found in the work of Gabriel Catren, where he writes: “The absolute thus constitutes the ‘open’ where the radical foundations and the last instances are suspended and towards which the successive transcendental problematisations of the Copernican revolution never cease to release experience.”[1] Here is the speculative path where the open and the absolute come together to overturn the limits of transcendental idealism and reclaim the scientific revolution from correlationist philosophy. The similitude between the open and the gap/spacing becomes even more important when they are considered together in the form of the abyss. As Catren writes:
The immanent transcendence that the absolute opens up within itself must be abyssal. The ‘unconscious’ abyss – i.e. the horizon of the absolute’s immanent alienation – is one of the phenomenological conditions of possibility of its effective realization under the form of a ‘self-consciousness.[2]
Without venturing too far into the complicated critique of phenomenology and self-consciousness suggested here,[3] it will suffice to point out the way in which the abyss has appeared before as the groundlessness of the transcendental imagination and the reason for the continued rewriting of the ‘transcendental deduction of the categories’ and the second and third critiques as an attempt to come to grips with the abyssal nature of the unity of apperception. In this sense, the proposal of the structure of trace-écart is merely another attempt at this deduction, however, this time the abyssiality of apperception as well as the openness of the absolute are incorporated into the categories themselves, which thus maintains the opening of the gap over the abyss rather than a need to cover it over. Catren even explicitly suggests something along these lines when he writes: “The amphibology between the gravitational spacing of the absolute within itself and its self-affective occurrence guarantees its suspended existence.”[4] However, it would seem that such spacing alone is not enough and the “gravitational” element of this statement could be seen as referring back to something like the arche-materiality of the trace, which in its inscription also opens the possibility of spacing. This, as a Kantian something=X rather than the Fichtean I=I critiqued above, provides a potential path to the absolute and a line for speculative philosophy to follow.
The issue of gravity reoccurs in the strange transhuman conception of the modern subject as an angel Catren develops. He writes: “The incorrectly labelled ‘state of weightlessness’ (or ‘zero gravity’) is nothing but a state upon which gravity freely acts.”[5] In the groundless abyss of the open absolute it is not that there is no gravity, but rather that gravity is relative and as such must be deployed freely. This constellation - of the transhuman and the idea of freedom in the abyssiality of apperception - brings to mind the transhumanist reading of the Kantian moral law as autonomy developed above. Catren has already argued against heternomity in his conception of the absolute, which “cannot be (hetero-)relative to something other than itself.”[6] Reading autonomy through the lens of the trace-écart structure it is perhaps now possible to address Brassier’s critique of autonomy, which takes aim at Žižek’s Hegelian form of materialism.
Part Ten: The Challenge of Facticity and the Gaps of the Absolute
[1] G. Catren, ‘Outland Empire.’ p. 350.
[2] G. Catren, ‘Outland Empire.’ p. 357.
[3] It seems that with his self-relational concept of the self-manifestation of the absolute through what he calls “Münchhausen’s bootstrapping” (p. 356) Catren does stray rather close to the Fichtean reading of Kant as the self-affirmation of I=I which Meillassoux identifies as the foundational correlationist error. See Meillassoux’s contribution to Collapse III R. Mackay (ed.). (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007). pp. 408-435; and Brassier’s summary of the errors of Fichtean idealism as strong correlationism in ‘Concepts and Objects’ p.p. 59-61.
[4] G. Catren, ‘Outland Empire.’ p. 360. My italics. In a more oblique manner, the concept of spacing could also be seen in the constant references to and by Mallarmé that Catren makes, and the importance of Mallarmé to the notion of spacing as the importance of the whites of the page in Derrida’s more textual exploration of spacing in both Of Grammatology (see p. 68) and also ‘The Double Session’ in Dissemination. B. Johnson (trans.), (London: The Athlone Press, 1981). Although Catren has the peculiar habit of pulling quotes from poets such as Rilke and Mallarmé completely out of any context of analysis in order to provide what seems like a purely rhetorical or poetical description
[5] G. Catren, ‘Outland Empire.’ p. 363.
[6] G. Catren, ‘Outland Empire.’ p. 348.











